Editing Talk:SELF - SPRX

Jump to navigation Jump to search
Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.

The edit can be undone. Please check the comparison below to verify that this is what you want to do, and then publish the changes below to finish undoing the edit.

Latest revision Your text
Line 1: Line 1:
== nas_plugin.sprx ==
[[Category:Software]]


<pre>
SELF
00000000  53 43 45 00 00 00 00 02  00 04 00 01 00 00 02 40  |SCE............@| magic SCE - version=2 - flags=4 - type=1=self - meta_offset=0x240
00000010  00 00 00 00 00 00 05 80  00 00 00 00 00 06 4d 58  |..............MX| header_len=0x580 - elf filesize=0x64d58
00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 70  |...............p| unknown=3 - appinfo_offset=0x70
00000030  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d0  |................| elf_offset=0x90 - phdr_offset = 0xd0
00000040  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 01 80  |................| shdr_offset=0x00 - section_info_offset=0x180
00000050  00 00 00 00 00 00 01 e0  00 00 00 00 00 00 01 f0  |................| sceversion_offset=0x1e0 - controlinfo_offset=0x1f0
00000060  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 70  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.......p........| controlinfo_size=0x70 - unknown=0


APP INFO:
To be merged with [[SELF File Format and Decryption]]
00000070  10 70 00 00 52 00 00 01  01 00 00 02 00 00 00 04  |.p..R...........| authid - unknown
00000080  00 03 00 40 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |...@............| programversion=0x030040 - unknown


ELF:
00000090  7f 45 4c 46 02 02 01 66  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.ELF...f........| ident
000000a0  ff a4 00 15 00 00 00 01  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| type=0xffa4 - machine=0x15 - version=1 - entry_point=0x00
000000b0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.......@........| phdr_offset=0x40 - shdr_offset=0
000000c0  01 00 00 00 00 40 00 38  00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00  |[email protected]........| flags=0x100 - elf_header_size=0x40 - phentsize=0x38 - phnum=3 - shentsize=shnum=shstrndx=0


PHDR:
=== NPDRM Header ===
000000d0  00 00 00 01 00 40 00 05  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0  |.....@..........| type=1 - flags=0x400005 - offset_in_file=0xf0
000000e0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 5a 20  |..............Z | virtual_addr = 0x0 - physical_addr=0x45a20
000000f0  00 00 00 00 00 04 99 88  00 00 00 00 00 04 99 88  |................| segment_size=0x49988 - seg_mem_size = 0x49988
00000100  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10                        alignment=0x10


                  00 00 00 01 00 60 00 06 |.............`..| type=1 - flags=0x600006
  typedef struct
00000110 00 00 00 00 00 04 9a 80 00 00 00 00 00 04 99 90 |................| offset_in_file=0x49a80 virtual_addr = 0x49990
  {
00000120 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 39 a8 |..............9.| physical_addr=0x0 - segment_size=0x39a8
  u32 block_type; // this is 3(NPDRM)
00000130 00 00 00 00 00 00 77 18 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 |......w.........| seg_mem_size = 0x7718 - alignment=0x10
  u32 block_size; // this is 0x90(sizeof(Self_NPDRM))
  u32 unknown1; //So far always 0
  u32 unknown2; //So far always 0
  u32 magic;      // 0x4E504400(NPD)
  u32 unknown3;    // So far always 1
u32 license;    // 1 Network License, 2 Local License, 3 Free
u32 type;    // 1 Executable, 21 Update for Disc Based Game
u8 titleid[0x30];
u8 hash_unknown[0x10];
u8 hash1[0x10];
u8 hash2[0x10];
u8 padding[0x10];
} Self_NPDRM


00000140  70 00 00 a4 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 04 d4 30  |p..............0| type=0x700000a4 - flags=0x00 - offset_in_file=0x4d430
Located after the Self Control Info.
00000150  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| virtual_addr = 0x0 - physical_addr=0x0
00000160  00 00 00 00 00 01 79 28  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |......y(........| segment_size=0x17928 - seg_mem_size = 0x0
00000170  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10                        alignment=0x10
  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| padding


SECTION INFO:
00000180  00 00 00 00 00 00 06 70  00 00 00 00 00 02 00 17  |.......p........| offset=0x670 - size=0x20017
00000190  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01  |................| compressed=2 - unknown=0 - unknown=0 - encrypted=1


000001a0  00 00 00 00 00 02 06 90  00 00 00 00 00 00 1c ac  |................| offset=0x20690 - size=0x1cac
000001b0  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01  |................| compressed=2 - unknown=0 - unknown=0 - encrypted=1


000001c0  00 00 00 00 00 02 23 50  00 00 00 00 00 00 4b 0c  |......#P......K.| offset=0x22350 - size=0x4b0c
000001d0  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01  |................| compressed=2 - unknown=0 - unknown=0 - encrypted=1


SCE VERSION INFO:
000001e0  00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00  |................| unknown=1 - unknown=0 - unknown=0x10 unknown=0


CONTROL INFO:
----
000001f0  00 00 00 01 00 00 00 30  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01  |.......0........| type=1=control_flags - size=0x30 - unknown=1
00000200  40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |@...............|
00000210  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|


00000220  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 40  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.......@........| type=2=file_digest - size=0x40 - unknown0
00000230  62 7c b1 80 8a b9 38 e3  2c 8c 09 17 08 72 6a 57  |b|....8.,....rjW| digest1
## metadata info: unknown
00000240  9e 25 86 e4 70 99 02 ae  b8 65 22 59 09 70 2f ed  |.%..p....e"Y.p/.| digest1 (4 bytes) - digest2
00000250  cb da 56 87 a5 24 54 8e  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |..V..$T.........| digest2 - padding


METADATA INFO:
00000260  e6 18 5e 1c 6b 3f 6c 6a  75 47 5d a4 f9 b1 3d 78  |..^.k?ljuG]...=x| key
00000270  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| key
00000280  d2 5a 0b 9a 13 fe 60 ca  a9 2b 90 a7 f1 df 35 7c  |.Z....`..+....5|| iv
00000290  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| iv


METADATA HEADER:
=== App Info header: ===
000002a0  00 00 00 00 00 00 05 00  00 00 00 01 00 00 00 03 |................| signature_input_length=0x500 - unknown=1 - section_count=3
Aligned to 0x10 bytes.
000002b0  00 00 00 18 00 00 00 30  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.......0........| key_count=0x18 - signature_info_size=0x30 - unknown=0 - unknown=0
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! field  
! offset
! type
! notes
|-
| authid   
| 0x00
| u64
|-
|unknown    
|0x08
|u32
|-
|app_type     
|0x0c
|u32
|
*1 -- level 0
*2 -- level 1
*3 -- level 2
*4 -- application
*5 -- isolated SPU module
*6 -- secure loader
*8 -- NP-DRM application
|-
|app_version
|0x10
|u64
|}


METADATA SECTION HEADER:
=== Encrypted phdr offset entry ===
000002c0  00 00 00 00 00 00 06 70  00 00 00 00 00 02 00 17  |.......p........| data_offset=0x670 - data_size=0x20017
There is one of these entries for each phdr entry in the elf file so that the ps3 knows where to decrypt the data from. (because it might also be compressed.)
000002d0  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 |................| unknown=2 - program_idx=0 - unknown=2 - sha1_index=0
{| class="wikitable"
000002e0  00 00 00 03 00 00 00 06  00 00 00 07 00 00 00 02 |................| encrypted=3=yes - key_index=6 ivec_index=7 compressed=2=yes
|-
! field !! offset !! type !! notes
|-
| Encrypted Data Offset || 0x00 ||u64 ||
|-
|Encrypted Data Size || 0x08 || u64 ||
|- 
|unknown || 0x10 || u32 || This has been 1 in all the examples I have seen.
|- 
|unknown || 0x14 || u32 || Always 0, as far as I know.
|-
|unknown || 0x18 || u32 || Always 0, as far as I know.
|-  
|unknown || 0x1c || u32 || This is 2 for loadable segment types, and 0 for other types.
|-  
|}


000002f0  00 00 00 00 00 02 06 90  00 00 00 00 00 00 1c ac  |................| data_offset=0x670 - data_size=0x20017
00000300  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 01  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 08  |................| unknown=2 - program_idx=1 - unknown=2 - sha1_index=8
00000310  00 00 00 03 00 00 00 0e  00 00 00 0f 00 00 00 02  |................| encrypted=3=yes - key_index=14 ivec_index=15 compressed=2=yes


00000320  00 00 00 00 00 02 23 50  00 00 00 00 00 00 4b 0c  |......#P......K.| data_offset=0x670 - data_size=0x20017
00000330  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 02  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 10  |................| unknown=2 - program_idx=2 - unknown=2 - sha1_index=10
00000340  00 00 00 03 00 00 00 16  00 00 00 17 00 00 00 02  |................| encrypted=3=yes - key_index=16 ivec_index=17 compressed=2=yes


METADATA KEYS:
00000350  f8 2b ca 1f 5b 03 16 30  69 75 82 8c b4 95 76 c5  |.+..[..0iu....v.| key1
00000360  bd 03 09 ae 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| key2
00000370  cb 18 c1 9e 44 d3 90 be  db d9 6d 59 00 54 fd 30  |....D.....mY.T.0| key3
00000380  4a b4 75 27 d1 bb b7 e0  0f 5b 60 4c 8b 67 c6 da  |J.u'.....[`L.g..| key4
00000390  83 98 13 bf ea 53 0f bd  af 83 52 17 51 a1 74 0a  |.....S....R.Q.t.| key5
000003a0  ab ea 6c 9e b9 f3 4b 8b  0a db e1 e6 96 7e 17 a6  |..l...K......~..| key6
000003b0  c6 5a c0 d3 a7 68 e1 7a  89 41 2a 32 15 73 82 1b  |.Z...h.z.A*2.s..| key7
000003c0  2c e6 7f 70 62 86 6e a9  36 ec f8 99 3a d4 ed 88  |,..pb.n.6...:...| key8
000003d0  69 7a ee a0 13 64 c9 38  7d 27 88 9e 95 76 ea 4a  |iz...d.8}'...v.J| key9
000003e0  2f 31 8e 13 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |/1..............| key10
000003f0  cb 18 c1 9e 44 d3 90 be  db d9 6d 59 00 54 fd 30  |....D.....mY.T.0| key11
00000400  4a b4 75 27 d1 bb b7 e0  0f 5b 60 4c 8b 67 c6 da  |J.u'.....[`L.g..| key12
00000410  83 98 13 bf ea 53 0f bd  af 83 52 17 51 a1 74 0a  |.....S....R.Q.t.| key13
00000420  ab ea 6c 9e b9 f3 4b 8b  0a db e1 e6 96 7e 17 a6  |..l...K......~..| key14
00000430  c6 5a c0 d3 a7 68 e1 7a  89 41 2a 32 15 73 82 1b  |.Z...h.z.A*2.s..| key15
00000440  2c e6 7f 70 62 86 6e a9  36 ec f8 99 3a d4 ed 88  |,..pb.n.6...:...| key16
00000450  ec 9a bc 91 0f 41 44 69  02 14 b2 8f bd 02 79 c4  |.....ADi......y.| key17
00000460  51 6d ac 7a 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |Qm.z............| key18
00000470  cb 18 c1 9e 44 d3 90 be  db d9 6d 59 00 54 fd 30  |....D.....mY.T.0| key19
00000480  4a b4 75 27 d1 bb b7 e0  0f 5b 60 4c 8b 67 c6 da  |J.u'.....[`L.g..| key20
00000490  83 98 13 bf ea 53 0f bd  af 83 52 17 51 a1 74 0a  |.....S....R.Q.t.| key21
000004a0  ab ea 6c 9e b9 f3 4b 8b  0a db e1 e6 96 7e 17 a6  |..l...K......~..| key22
000004b0  c6 5a c0 d3 a7 68 e1 7a  89 41 2a 32 15 73 82 1b  |.Z...h.z.A*2.s..| key23
000004c0  2c e6 7f 70 62 86 6e a9  36 ec f8 99 3a d4 ed 88  |,..pb.n.6...:...| key24


SIGNATURE INFO:
{| class="wikitable"
000004d0  00 00 00 01 00 00 00 30  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.......0........| unknown=1 - signature_size=0x30 - unknown=0
|-
000004e0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| unknown=0 - unknown=0
! field !! offset !! type !! notes
000004f0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 7b  00 00 00 01 00 02 00 00  |.......{........| unknown=0 - unknown=0
|-
00000500  00 1a 7a b5 11 0a 4a 41  2b 8e d6 8b 9e 18 1c 74  |..z...JA+......t| R[21]
| Magic || 0x0 || u32 || Must be "SCE\0"
00000510  58 5b 0e 94 a7 00 c2 24  cd 2d d1 1f 9b e2 81 71  |X[.....$.-.....q| R (5 bytes) - S[21]
|-
00000520  dc 45 22 83 db 9e 72 38  2f 94 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.E"...r8/.......| S (10 bytes) - padding
| version || 0x4 || u32 || This must be 2 or the Self loader will abort
00000530  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| padding
|-
00000540  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| padding
| flags || 0x8 || u16||  
00000550  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| padding
*0: retail type 0
00000560  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| padding
*1: retail
00000570  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| padding
*2: retail type 1
*0x8000: devkit
*4: unknown, games that require 3.42.
*7: unknown, all games that require 3.50 have that flag.


ENCRYPTED ELF HEADER?:
0001: FW 1.00 (app version 1.0.0)
00000580  36 2a 61 73 99 41 75 19  cc a7 42 22 fb f4 b5 cc  |6*as.Au...B"....|
...
00000590 68 06 c7 c1 7e b3 8d 49  d5 41 a7 ec b7 07 02 3b  |h...~..I.A.....;|
  0001: FW 3.15 (app version 3.15.0)
000005a0 b9 db ca 53 04 fb 64 b9  e8 82 f4 3c 58 13 60 0d  |...S..d....<X.`.|
0001: FW 3.20 (app version 3.20.0)
000005b0 97 80 25 f5 13 a7 1b 09  35 e5 dd 9a 56 79 b2 a3  |..%.....5...Vy..|
0001: FW 3.21 (app version 3.21.0)
000005c0 ba c9 fb f2 f6 10 47 22  f2 a7 94 a9 06 b8 68 7b  |......G"......h{|
  0001: FW 3.30 (app version 3.30.0)
000005d0 f6 3d 07 5b 29 51 e6 70  12 17 93 8e c8 01 bb 80  |.=.[)Q.p........|
0004: FW 3.40 (app version 3.40.0)
000005e0 8d f6 c1 93 94 60 51 0c  76 43 99 4a dd 26 1a 56  |.....`Q.vC.J.&.V|
  0004: FW 3.41 (app version 3.40.0)
000005f0 4d ba 8d be df 91 70 93  46 ca b2 2d 67 24 5f 40  |M.....p.F..-g$_@|
  0004: FW 3.42 (app version 3.40.0)
00000600 ba 4d 92 b2 f0 c7 c8 67  92 f4 fe 24 ba 42 4d 90  |.M.....g...$.BM.|
  0007: FW 3.50 (app version 3.55.0)
00000610 9c 93 b9 9d 01 4a dc 4d  99 95 8d e9 92 97 2e ed  |.....J.M........|
  000a: FW 3.55 (app version 3.55.0)
00000620 8d 82 a4 0a 19 5b 85 3d  53 cf 24 a3 61 50 5f 42  |.....[.=S.$.aP_B|
  000d: FW 3.56 (app version 3.56.0)
00000630 a6 44 78 67 29 f5 ae 04  55 fd 7a cd fe 63 d9 63  |.Dxg)...U.z..c.c|
  0010: FW 3.60 (app version 3.60.0)
00000640 e4 18 95 0c 65 e5 22 a6  ba 8b fe ca a5 2e 0f 77  |....e."........w|
  0010: FW 3.61 (app version 3.61.0)
00000650 b7 3b c3 7b 81 03 72 67  f3 7c 16 68 ab 05 30 78  |.;.{..rg.|.h..0x|
  0013: FW 3.65 (app version 3.65.0)
00000660  d4 dc 5e 11 30 d5 cf 1a  55 fe 65 94 f9 18 b9 ab  |..^.0...U.e.....|
  0013: FW 3.66 (app version 3.66.0)
  0016: FW 3.70 (app version 3.70.0)
  0016: FW 3.72 (app version 3.70.0)
|-
|-
|}


PROGRAM SECTION 0:
00000670  78 9c e4 bd 0f 7c 54 d5  99 3f 7c ce bd 13 92 00  |x....|T..?|.....|
00000680  6a d0 a0 a1 24 90 00 76  c1 60 89 5b ec 6f 62 82  |j...$..v.`.[.ob.|
00000690  4e 14 f7 73 31 d8 37 76  61 8d 8a ed 84 40 37 29  |N..s1.7va....@7)|
[....]
00020670  4b e6 31 a2 f7 0a 34 bf  4e cb 29 8c 61 c8 0a 22  |K.1...4.N.).a.."|
00020680  f7 ff 01 c0 d7 e4 42 bc  3f 7a 48 af 45 ef 28 3a  |......B.?zH.E.(:|


PROGRAM SECTION 1:
00020690  78 9c d5 9a 8d 5f d5 e5  dd c7 7f e7 9c 9f 0e 2d  |x...._.........-|
000206a0  8b 9a 95 36 2b d7 50 f1  91 c3 83 88 88 82 8a 8a  |...6+.P.........|
000206b0  8a 8a 0f 6b 6c b3 3b 89  07 41 11 f0 80 0a 8a 0a  |...kl.;..A......|
[...]
00022330  4e bb 13 f9 17 07 fd 1f  90 b6 10 8a bc 3f 7a 48  |N............?zH|
00022340  af 45 ef 28 3a 05 98 10  3f e8 79 3a da 48 d5 2c  |.E.(:...?.y:.H.,|
PROGRAM SECTION 2:
00022350  78 9c 75 bd 7b b4 9d f5  79 df b9 cf d1 91 10 12  |x.u.{...y.......|
00022360  11 ba 9c fb f5 3d f7 fb  fd 0e 42 da a0 2b e8 82  |.....=....B..+..|
00022370  84 24 74 01 27 1b 73 13  08 1b 01 02 24 ae 5b 20  |.$t.'.s.....$.[ |
00022380  09 64 0b 24 21 01 72 4d  d2 9d c4 ed f2 4c 3d 0d  |.d.$!.rM.....L=.|
[...]
00026e20  5d f5 3c 0f 1e ea eb 59  99 79 f0 f0 6d d7 21 fa  |].<....Y.y..m.!.|
00026e30  e1 d5 7a ff 61 1e 3c 7c  5b eb 6b 1e 3c 7c db 75  |..z.a.<|[.k.<|.u|
00026e40  08 1e 7e cd be 61 fe b0  5a df bf 9e 2f e0 73 b2  |..~..a..Z.../.s.|
00026e50  d2 d1 0f 0f be fa ff 01  59 ad 0c 11              |........Y...|
00026e5c
</pre>


----


== lv2_kernel.self ==
==NPDRM Self algorithm==
THIS DOES NOT ALLOW TO OBTAIN 3.60+ keys, nor piracy as you require the rif, act.dat and IDPS


<pre>
On NPDRM self decryption all the security levels of the PS3 are involved: user space (vsh), kernel space(lv2), hypervisor( lv1) and isolated SPU (metldr + appldr)
SELF:
00000000  53 43 45 00 00 00 00 02  00 00 00 01 00 00 01 e0  |SCE.............| magic SCE - version=2 - flags=0 - type=1=self - meta_offset=0x1e0
00000010  00 00 00 00 00 00 05 00  00 00 00 00 00 35 93 98  |.............5..| header_len=0x500 - elf filesize=0x359398
00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 70  |...............p| unknown=3 - appinfo_offset=0x70
00000030  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d0  |................| elf_offset=0x90 - phdr_offset = 0xd0
00000040  00 00 00 00 00 17 47 58  00 00 00 00 00 00 01 40  |......GX.......@| shdr_offset=0x174758 - section_info_offset=0x140
00000050  00 00 00 00 00 00 01 80  00 00 00 00 00 00 01 90  |................| sceversion_offset=0x180 - controlinfo_offset=0x190
00000060  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 70  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.......p........| controlinfo_size=0x70 - unknown=0


APP INFO:
The process start on vsh.elf...
00000070  10 50 00 00 03 00 00 01  05 00 00 02 00 00 00 03  |.P..............| authid - unknown
00000080  00 03 00 55 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |...U............|programversion=0x030055 - unknown


ELF:
===VSH===
00000090  7f 45 4c 46 02 02 01 66  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.ELF...f........| ident
000000a0  00 02 00 15 00 00 00 01  80 00 00 00 00 00 01 00  |................| type=0x02 - machine=0x15 - version=1 - entry_point=0x8000000000000100
000000b0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40  00 00 00 00 00 35 90 d8  |[email protected]..| phdr_offset=0x40 - shdr_offset=0x3590d8
000000c0  00 00 00 00 00 40 00 38  00 02 00 40 00 0b 00 0a  |[email protected]...@....| flags=0x0 - elf_header_size=0x40 - phentsize=0x38 - phnum=2 - shentsize=0x40 - shnum=11 shstrndx=10


PHDR:
Once the vsh detects that user is trying to start a self, it looks for the appinfo header type. If the type is 8, then the control digest element type 3 (NPD element) is located. From this NPD header the vsh gets the license type (free, local or network license).
000000d0  00 00 00 01 00 00 00 05  00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00  |................| type=1 - flags=0x5 - offset_in_file=0x10000
000000e0  80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| virtual_addr=0x8000000000000000 - physical_addr=0x8000000000000000
000000f0  00 00 00 00 00 33 29 48  00 00 00 00 00 33 29 48  |.....3)H.....3)H| segment_size=0x332948 - seg_mem_size = 0x332948
00000100  00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00                        alignment=0x10000


                    00 00 00 01 00 00 00 06  |................| type=1 - flags=0x6
If a free content(type 3) is detected then a generic klicense will be use for further steps (go to LV2). That klicensee is already public (see geohot npdrm_omac_key_1).
00000110  00 00 00 00 00 34 29 80  80 00 00 00 00 33 29 80  |.....4)......3).| offset_in_file=0x342980 - virtual_addr=0x8000000000332980
00000120  80 00 00 00 00 33 29 80  00 00 00 00 00 01 67 10  |.....3).......g.| physical_addr=0x8000000000332980 - segment_size=0x16710
00000130  00 00 00 00 00 13 23 e0  00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00  |......#.........| seg_mem_size=0x1323e0  - alignment=0x10000


SECTION INFO:
However if a paid content is to be loaded the vsh loads the act.dat and the rif associated to the content (if local it will locate a file with the same titleid on NPD element, if remote it will download to vsh process memory)
00000140  00 00 00 00 00 01 05 00  00 00 00 00 00 15 e8 cf  |................| offset=0x10500 - size=0x15e8cf
00000150  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01  |................| compressed=2 - unknown=0 - unknown=0 - encrypted=1


00000160  00 00 00 00 00 16 ee 10  00 00 00 00 00 00 58 ff  |..............X.| offset=0x16ee10 - size=0x58ff
Then the signature is checked (last 0x28 bytes of both RIF and act.dat). The curves used are on vsh.self. It is a 3 element table, having the first curve nulled. The curve index for rif/act is 2. The curve values are negated as in the apploader and has the following structure
00000170  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01  |................| compressed=2 - unknown=0 - unknown=0 - encrypted=1


SCE VERSION INFO:
struct curve {
00000180 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 |................| unknown=1 - unknown=0 - unknown=0x10 unknown=0
uint8_t p[0x14];
  uint8_t a[0x14];
  uint8_t b[0x14];
uint8_t N[0x14];
uint8_t Gx[0x14];
uint8_t Gy[0x14];
  }


CONTROL INFO:
If the curve checks then vsh will process the rif:
00000190  00 00 00 01 00 00 00 30  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01  |.......0........| type=1=control_flags - size=0x30 - unknown=1
000001a0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000001b0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|


000001c0 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.......@........| type=2=file_digest - size=0x40 - unknown0
  struct rif {
000001d0 62 7c b1 80 8a b9 38 e3 2c 8c 09 17 08 72 6a 57 |b|....8.,....rjW| digest1
  uint8_t unk1[0x10]; //version, license type and user number
## metadata info: unknown
  uint8_t titleid[0x30]; //Content ID
000001e0 9e 25 86 e4 db 07 41 be 58 79 52 c4 5c 72 aa a9 |.%....A.XyR.\r..| digest1 (4 bytes) - digest2
  uint8 padding[0xC]; //Padding for randomness
000001f0 15 bf a6 78 b2 6a 71 f2  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |...x.jq.........| digest2 - padding
  uint32_t actDatIndex; //Key index on act.dat between 0x00 and 0x7F
uint8 key[0x10]; //encrypted klicensee
  uint64_t unk2; //timestamp??
  uint64_t unk3; //Always 0
  uint8_t rs[0x28];
  };


METADATA INFO:
struct ACTDAT {
00000200 f3 f3 d1 7d 4d d1 54 0f  1c 83 7a 1f d2 ba 4a f8 |...}M.T...z...J.| key
  uint8_t unk1[0x10]; //Version, User number
00000210  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| key
  uint8_t keyTable[0x800]; //Key Table
00000220  ab 43 41 53 e8 2e 40 43  63 2b 44 6d 47 12 bb 83 |.CAS..@Cc+DmG...| iv
  ......
00000230 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| iv
  uint8_t signature[0x28];
  }


METADATA HEADER:
Using the RIF_KEY it will obtain the actdatIndex:
00000240  00 00 00 00 00 00 04 80  00 00 00 01 00 00 00 03  |................| signature_input_length=0x480 - unknown=1 - section_count=3
00000250  00 00 00 16 00 00 00 30  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.......0........| key_count=0x16 - signature_info_size=0x30 - unknown=0 - unknown=0


METADATA SECTION HEADER:
AES_KEY rifKey;
00000260  00 00 00 00 00 01 05 00  00 00 00 00 00 15 e8 cf |................| data_offset=0x10500 - data_size=0x15e8cf
  int result = AES_set_decrypt_key(RIF_KEY, 0x80, &rifKey);
00000270  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 |................| unknown=2 - program_idx=0 - unknown=2 - sha1_index=0
  AES_decrypt(&rif->padding, &rif->padding, &rifKey);
00000280  00 00 00 03 00 00 00 06  00 00 00 07 00 00 00 02  |................| encrypted=3=yes - key_index=6 ivec_index=7 compressed=2=yes


00000290  00 00 00 00 00 16 ee 10  00 00 00 00 00 00 58 ff  |..............X.| data_offset=0x16ee10 - data_size=0x58ff
And finally having the actDat key index the execution pass to LV2 syscall 471
000002a0  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 01  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 08  |................| unknown=2 - program_idx=1 - unknown=2 - sha1_index=8
000002b0  00 00 00 03 00 00 00 0e  00 00 00 0f 00 00 00 02  |................| encrypted=3=yes - key_index=14 ivec_index=15 compressed=2=yes


000002c0  00 00 00 00 00 17 47 58  00 00 00 00 00 00 02 c0  |......GX........| data_offset=0x174758 - data_size=0x2c0
===LV2===
000002d0  00 00 00 01 00 00 00 03  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 10  |................| unknown=1 - program_idx=3 - unknown=2 - sha1_index=16
000002e0  00 00 00 01 ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 01  |................| encrypted=1=no - key_index=-1 ivec_index=-1 compressed=1=no


METADATA KEYS:
Lv2 is accessed using syscall471 which haves the following syntax:
000002f0  a0 40 36 6b 2d 8a 50 99  1e b3 0c 53 e5 9b 5d 6e  |[email protected]..]n| key1
00000300  61 2c ac b8 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |a,..............| key2
00000310  a0 79 91 e9 66 93 d8 d0  cc 57 c7 da c5 7d df 40  |.y..f....W...}.@| key3
00000320  78 d3 5a 96 be 8d 67 10  44 0b 4a 2d 8e cc a0 61  |x.Z...g.D.J-...a| key4
00000330  28 18 04 78 21 95 6b 69  2c d1 35 1f 69 a3 52 5f  |(..x!.ki,.5.i.R_| key5
00000340  97 1c 93 d8 99 52 2a 91  e4 3a b5 10 26 14 df 44  |.....R*..:..&..D| key6
00000350  b7 f9 6f 37 6f 86 f2 96  0d e5 92 ba 45 93 2f ee  |..o7o.......E./.| key7
00000360  53 6e 64 e9 ac 34 53 b6  85 57 4b 8e f8 9b 78 91  |Snd..4S..WK...x.| key8
00000370  30 7a 7b df 71 a5 95 ba  4a 2a 37 90 92 15 25 e6  |0z{.q...J*7...%.| key9
00000380  ef 65 b9 ee 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.e..............| key10
00000390  a0 79 91 e9 66 93 d8 d0  cc 57 c7 da c5 7d df 40  |.y..f....W...}.@| key11
000003a0  78 d3 5a 96 be 8d 67 10  44 0b 4a 2d 8e cc a0 61  |x.Z...g.D.J-...a| key12
000003b0  28 18 04 78 21 95 6b 69  2c d1 35 1f 69 a3 52 5f  |(..x!.ki,.5.i.R_| key13
000003c0  97 1c 93 d8 99 52 2a 91  e4 3a b5 10 26 14 df 44  |.....R*..:..&..D| key14
000003d0  b7 f9 6f 37 6f 86 f2 96  0d e5 92 ba 45 93 2f ee  |..o7o.......E./.| key15
000003e0  53 6e 64 e9 ac 34 53 b6  85 57 4b 8e f8 9b 78 91  |Snd..4S..WK...x.| key16
000003f0  5e a2 e9 83 2d a2 4a 14  ce 8c 6f 9c 31 b1 4f 3f  |^...-.J...o.1.O?| key17
00000400  f0 73 f2 d8 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.s..............| key18
00000410  a0 79 91 e9 66 93 d8 d0  cc 57 c7 da c5 7d df 40  |.y..f....W...}.@| key19
00000420  78 d3 5a 96 be 8d 67 10  44 0b 4a 2d 8e cc a0 61  |x.Z...g.D.J-...a| key20
00000430  28 18 04 78 21 95 6b 69  2c d1 35 1f 69 a3 52 5f  |(..x!.ki,.5.i.R_| key21
00000440  97 1c 93 d8 99 52 2a 91  e4 3a b5 10 26 14 df 44  |.....R*..:..&..D| key22


SIGNATURE INFO:
  int syscall_471(uint32_t type, char* titleID, void* klicensee, uint8_t* actdat, uint8_t* rif, int32_t licenseType, uint8_t* magicVersion);
00000450 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 30  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.......0........| unknown=1 - signature_size=0x30 - unknown=0
00000460  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| unknown=0 - unknown=0
00000470  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 7b  00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00  |.......{........| unknown=7b - unknown=0x100 - unknown=0


SIGNATURE:
The function has different parameters depending if the content is debug, free or paid:
00000480  00 c6 39 a4 4e b4 3f d9  b5 dd 06 f2 e3 b0 88 5e  |..9.N.?........^| R[21]
00000490  5d 7a d9 ee a5 00 5f 33  6a ff c2 8b 70 eb cf 50  |]z...._3j...p..P| R (5 bytes) - S[21]
000004a0  2e b8 07 36 2e db 37 5b  db f4 00 00 00 00 00 00  |...6..7[........| S (10 bytes) - padding
000004b0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| padding
000004c0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| padding
000004d0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| padding
000004e0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| padding
000004f0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| padding


FREE: syscall471(npd.type, &npd.titleID, freeklicensee, NULL, NULL, npd.license, &npd);
PAID: syscall471(npd.type, &npd.titleID, NULL, &actdat.keyTable[rif.actDatIndex], &rif.key, npd.license, &npd);


ENCRYPTED ELF HEADER?:
The lv2 keeps a memory table with contentID and the associated key.
00000500  36 2a 61 73 99 41 75 19  cc a7 42 22 fb f4 b5 cc  |6*as.Au...B"....|
When it receives a free content (r5 is not null) then copies the titleID and the klicensee to the table. For a paid content the rif.key is converted to the klicensee using:
00000510  41 7a bf 27 c8 f6 c1 13  7c f3 d2 03 e9 67 35 09  |Az.'....|....g5.|
00000520  40 21 6b b8 81 9f 69 fa  7d 8a 1b 29 b1 8c 97 23  |@!k...i.}..)...#|
00000530  f9 ff e3 dc 3e 82 91 f9  78 28 f8 2b e4 b4 ee 69  |....>...x(.+...i|
[...]
000104c0  94 68 af d6 3f 1d 1d ce  fa b8 75 92 e8 c2 54 da  |.h..?.....u...T.|
000104d0  5a 32 f2 44 c1 f8 72 66  5f 8f ac ae 1e d1 43 8d  |Z2.D..rf_.....C.|
000104e0  f6 5b bb 24 91 f7 9c 1b  f5 6b cc ca 89 93 8c c4  |.[.$.....k......|
000104f0  bc b4 de ed 70 36 4d 22  f4 3f 71 27 03 e1 28 b4  |....p6M".?q'..(.|


PROGRAM SECTION 0:
AES_KEY IDPSKey, ConstKey, ActDatKey;
00010500 78 9c ec bd 0f 7c 54 d5 9d 37 fc bb 93 49 32 01 |x....|T..7...I2.|
  uint8_t encrConst[0x10];
00010510  5c 43 3b d6 28 ff 06 c1  32 01 6a 62 45 3b 31 01 |\C;.(...2.jbE;1.|
  uint8_t decryptedActDat[0x10];
00010520 26 82 f5 42 60 37 56 2c  58 b5 9d 08 b6 a0 f6 f3  |&..B`7V,X.......|
  uint8_t klicensee[0x10];
00010530 a0 8b dd 8b 99 61 26 10  dd 50 e9 fb 84 aa db a0  |.....a&..P......|
  int result = AES_set_encrypt_key(&IDPSVariation, 0x80, &IDPSKey);
00010540 01 87 0a 14 56 7d 16 1f  a9 a2 05 0c fe 61 a1 ea  |....V}.......a..|
  AES_encrypt(&CONSTACTDAT, &encrConst, &IDPSKey);
[...]
  result = AES_set_decrypt_key(&encrConst,0x80,&ConstKey);
0016edd0  3f 7a 48 af 45 ef 28 3a  05 98 10 3f e8 79 3a da |?zH.E.(:...?.y:.|
  AES_decrypt(actDat,&decryptedActDat,&ConstKey);
0016ede0 48 d5 2c 75 e5 4d 70 57  a4 1e b5 ae 32 16 6e 57  |H.,u.MpW....2.nW|
  result = AES_set_decrypt_key(&decryptedActDat,0x80,&ActDatKey);
0016edf0  5c 26 d6 4f c4 90 0b 9a  87 4f 85 43 68 76 ca 8b  |\&.O.....O.Chv..|
  AES_decrypt(rif,&klicensee,&ActDatKey);
0016ee00  e0 0f fd 68 eb 4b de e0  2d 3f 4e 8d 02 ce a2 37  |...h.K..-?N....7|


PROGRAM SECTION 1:
where CONSTACTDAT is a constant value on lv2, IDPSVaritaion appears to be IDPS (not checked but DRM_Manager_initialize (see graf_chokolo's "bible") to something with the same structure), actdat are the 0x10bytes selected by rif keyIndex, and rif is rif.key (bytes 0x50-0x5f).
0016ee10  78 9c ed 9d 09 5c 54 55  fb f8 ef b0 09 8a 0a ae  |x....\TU........|
0016ee20  b8 8f 3a 2a 29 0e 33 30  22 ee 93 6d 53 b9 a0 59  |..:*).30"..mS..Y|
0016ee30  e1 92 82 82 82 2b 89 0b  9a cb a8 2d 96 a9 98 4b  |.....+.....-...K|
0016ee40  a6 65 94 96 64 6e f5 a6  99 2d 8e a9 89 b9 61 ae  |.e..dn...-....a.|
0016ee50  65 1a 5a 9a 5a 99 bb b8  ff 0f de ef 45 e6 32 17  |e.Z.Z.......E.2.|
0016ee60  06 93 de de ff af f9 38  3e f7 dc 7b ce 73 9e fd  |.......8>..{.s..|
[...]
00174710  e4 12 72 5f 3d 18 15 7b  9f fc 9d ea 2e 55 67 c0  |..r_=..{.....Ug.|
00174720  5a 73 60 83 ab 41 23 a0  ad c1 7c ba 3a 40 c9 63  |Zs`..A#...|.:@.c|
00174730  c0 f7 38 5e 58 42 f7 dc  77 74 4d 53 b3 0b 19 22  |..8^XB..wtMS..."|
00174740  f6 70 4d 22 d6 fc 11 51  9b 20 81 e7 81 09 cb 82  |.pM"...Q. ......|
00174750  f9 71 76 a4 3b 02 cd 10


Once transformed it is stored on memory table...


SECTION HEADERS 3:
I haven't check further steps on vsh nor lv2 so perhaps there are further transformations on the paid case (NOT FOR THE FREE AS I HAVE DECRYPTED THOSE) so we are jumping directly to the appldr
                                  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |        ........| name_idx=0x00 type=0x0=unused
00174760  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| flags=0 - virtual_addr=0x00
00174770  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| offset_in_file=0x00 - size=0x00
00174780  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| link=0 - info=0 - addr_align=0x00
00174790  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                        entries_size=0x00


                                  00 00 00 0b 00 00 00 01  |................| name_idx=0xb type=1=progbits
===AppLdr===
001747a0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 07  80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| flags=0x7 - virtual_addr=0x8000000000000000
001747b0  00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 30 28  |..............0(| offset_in_file=0x10000 - size=0x3028
001747c0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04  |................| link=0 - info=0 - addr_align=0x04
001747d0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                        entries_size=0x00


                                  00 00 00 11 00 00 00 01  |................| name_idx=0x11 type=1=progbits
As you can see from graf_chokolo payloads a parameter is passed on spu_args.field60. That parameter is the previously stored klicensee.
001747e0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06  80 00 00 00 00 00 30 80  |..............0.| flags=0x6 - virtual_addr=0x8000000000003080
001747f0  00 00 00 00 00 01 30 80  00 00 00 00 00 2b 87 04  |......0......+..| offset_in_file=0x13080 - size=0x2b8704
00174800  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04  |................| link=0 - info=0 - addr_align=0x04
00174810  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                      entries_size=0x00


                                  00 00 00 17 00 00 00 01  |................| name_idx=0x17 type=1=progbits
However this key must be transformed (again) even for the free case. The transformation is:
00174820  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02  80 00 00 00 00 2b b7 90  |.............+..| flags=0x2 - virtual_addr=0x80000000002bb790
00174830  00 00 00 00 00 2c b7 90  00 00 00 00 00 02 41 9c  |.....,........A.| offset_in_file=0x2cb790 - size=0x2419c
00174840  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08  |................| link=0 - info=0 - addr_align=0x08
00174850  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                      entries_size=0x00


                                  00 00 00 1f 00 00 00 01 |................| name_idx=0x1f type=1=progbits
  uint8_t decryptedKLicensee[0x10]
00174860 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03  80 00 00 00 00 2d f9 30  |.............-.0| flags=0x3 - virtual_addr=0x80000000002df930
  uint8_t KLicenseeDecryptKey[] = {0xf2, 0xfb, 0xca, 0x7a, 0x75, 0xb0, 0x4e, 0xdc, 0x13, 0x90, 0x63, 0x8c, 0xcd, 0xfd, 0xd1, 0xee};
00174870 00 00 00 00 00 2e f9 30  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 |.......0........| offset_in_file=0x2ef930 - size=0x80
  AES_KEY KLicenseeKey
00174880 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 |................| link=0 - info=0 - addr_align=0x08
  int result = AES_set_decrypt_key(KLicenseeDecryptKey,0x80,&KLICENSEEKEY);
00174890  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                      entries_size=0x00
  AES_decrypt(klicensee,&decryptedKLicensee,&KLicenseeKey);
  EY is another key located inside the apploader and klicensee is the parameter.


                                  00 00 00 26 00 00 00 01  |...........&....| name_idx=0x26 type=1=progbits
Then we can finally remove the NPDRM layer using:
001748a0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03  80 00 00 00 00 2d f9 b0  |.............-..| flags=0x3 - virtual_addr=0x80000000002df9b0
001748b0  00 00 00 00 00 2e f9 b0  00 00 00 00 00 00 5f 10  |.............._.| offset_in_file=0x2ef9b0 - size=0x5f10
001748c0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01  |................| link=0 - info=0 - addr_align=0x01
001748d0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                      entries_size=0x00


                                  00 00 00 2c 00 00 00 01 |...........,....| name_idx=0x2c type=1=progbits
  AES_KEY key;
001748e0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 80 00 00 00 00 2e 58 c0 |..............X.| flags=0x3 - virtual_addr=0x80000000002e58c0
  uint8_t iv[0x10];
001748f0 00 00 00 00 00 2f 58 c0  00 00 00 00 00 04 2c 78  |...../X.......,x| offset_in_file=0x2f58c0 - size=0x42c78
  memset(&iv[0],0,0x10);
00174900  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08  |................| link=0 - info=0 - addr_align=0x08
  int result = AES_set_decrypt_key(&KLicenseeDecryptKey,0x80,&key);
00174910  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                      entries_size=0x00
  AES_cbc_encrypt(self + self->metaoffset + 0x20, self + self->metaoffset + 0x20,0x40,&key,&iv,0);


                                  00 00 00 31 00 00 00 01  |...........1....| name_idx=0x31 type=1=progbits
Observe the above code in action at [http://pastie.org/2647887]
00174920  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03  80 00 00 00 00 32 85 40  |.............2.@| flags=0x3 - virtual_addr=0x8000000000328540
00174930  00 00 00 00 00 33 85 40  00 00 00 00 00 00 a4 08  |.....3.@........| offset_in_file=0x338540 - size=0xa408
00174940  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08  |................| link=0 - info=0 - addr_align=0x08
00174950  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                      entries_size=0x00


                                  00 00 00 36 00 00 00 01  |...........6....| name_idx=0x36 type=1=progbits
Once that layer is removed we proceed as normal:
00174960  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03  80 00 00 00 00 33 29 80  |.............3).| flags=0x3 - virtual_addr=0x8000000000332980
*Decrypt using AESCBC256 with the NPDRM keys to obtain the metadata keys
00174970  00 00 00 00 00 34 29 80  00 00 00 00 00 01 67 10  |.....4).......g.| offset_in_file=0x342980 - size=0x16710
*Decrypt using AESCTR128 the data sha,hmac,iv keys
00174980  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80  |................| link=0 - info=0 - addr_align=0x80
*Decrypt the data.
00174990  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                      entries_size=0x00


                                  00 00 00 3c 00 00 00 08  |...........<....| name_idx=0x3c - type=8=nobits
'''Source:''' http://www.ps3hax.net/showpost.php?p=259713&postcount=1 JuanNadie
001749a0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03  80 00 00 00 00 34 90 90  |.............4..| flags=0x3 - virtual_addr=0x8000000000349090
001749b0  00 00 00 00 00 35 90 90  00 00 00 00 00 11 bc d0  |.....5..........| offset_in_file=0x359090 - size=0x11bcd0
001749c0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 80 00  |................| link=0 - info=0 - addr_align=0x8000
001749d0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                      entries_size=0x00


                                  00 00 00 01 00 00 00 03  |................| name_idx=0x1 - type=3=strtable
'''Footnote:''' KLicenseeDecryptKey is located in appldr twice, e.g.
001749e0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................| flags=0x00 - virtual_addr=0x00
001749f0  00 00 00 00 00 35 90 90  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 41  |.....5.........A|
00174a00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01  |................| link=0 - info=0 - addr_align=0x01
00174a10  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                          |........|        entries_size=0x00
00174a18
</pre>


----
1.00:
  Offset(h) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
     
  000187C0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  000187D0  F2 FB CA 7A 75 B0 4E DC 13 90 63 8C CD FD D1 EE  òûÊzu°NÜ..cŒÍýÑî
  000187E0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  000187F0  F2 FB CA 7A 75 B0 4E DC 13 90 63 8C CD FD D1 EE  òûÊzu°NÜ..cŒÍýÑî


3.15:
  Offset(h) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
     
  00018EB0  F2 FB CA 7A 75 B0 4E DC 13 90 63 8C CD FD D1 EE  òûÊzu°NÜ..cŒÍýÑî
  00018EC0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  00018ED0  F2 FB CA 7A 75 B0 4E DC 13 90 63 8C CD FD D1 EE  òûÊzu°NÜ..cŒÍýÑî
  00018EE0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................


== Sign executables for 3.73+ (mathieulh's "drama") ==
3.55:
  Offset(h) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
     
  00019730  F2 FB CA 7A 75 B0 4E DC 13 90 63 8C CD FD D1 EE  òûÊzu°NÜ..cŒÍýÑî
  00019740  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  00019750  F2 FB CA 7A 75 B0 4E DC 13 90 63 8C CD FD D1 EE  òûÊzu°NÜ..cŒÍýÑî
  00019760  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................


<pre>
3.56:
[21:00:58] <Mathieulh> selfs are a mess to generate properly because a lot of values need to be calculated from the original elf file
  Offset(h) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
[21:01:11] <Mathieulh> the problem is right now all the public tools use hardcoded values
     
[21:01:19] <Mathieulh> that are grabbed from various self files
  0001F920  F2 FB CA 7A 75 B0 4E DC 13 90 63 8C CD FD D1 EE  òûÊzu°NÜ..cŒÍýÑî
[21:01:21] <Mathieulh> but are not calculated
  0001F930  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[21:01:34] <Mathieulh> well that's one of the many problems actually
  0001F940  F2 FB CA 7A 75 B0 4E DC 13 90 63 8C CD FD D1 EE  òûÊzu°NÜ..cŒÍýÑî
[21:01:35] <jevin> Mathieulh, things other than elf offsets?
  0001F950  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[21:01:40] <Mathieulh> yah
[21:02:03] <Mathieulh> sony also did some fancy things with the compression self format
[21:02:12] <Mathieulh> where values are off by a certain offset etc etc
[21:02:38] <Mathieulh> if you want to make a proper self tool
[21:02:44] <Mathieulh> you first need to reverse make_fself
[21:03:06] <jevin> not too hard with hexrays *cough*
[21:03:09] <Mathieulh> that's the initial step
[21:03:15] <Mathieulh> yeah it's not that hard
[21:03:29] <Mathieulh> then you'll figure what a big fuck up the self format really is xD
[21:05:14] <Mathieulh> but yeah just my self.cpp is 5 times larger than the entire source for geohot make_self/make_self_npdrm
[21:05:27] <Mathieulh> in terms of lines of code
[21:05:48] <Mathieulh> so his is missing shitloads of stuffs and only relies on hardcoded values
[21:06:06] <jevin>         entire headers copypasta'ed from existing selfs
[21:06:11] <Mathieulh> pretty much yah xD
[21:06:23] <Mathieulh> the ones on the tool I use are generated
[21:06:32] <Mathieulh> as in calculated and generated
[21:06:36] <Mathieulh> from the original elf
[21:06:52] <Mathieulh> btw unself is buggy too
[21:06:54] <Mathieulh> just so you know
[21:07:16] <jevin>         why havent you labeled the control flags? :)
[21:08:16] <Mathieulh> jevin I didn't feel the need to, I already know what they do anyway
[21:08:37] <Mathieulh> for example 0x40 is root rights, 0x20 is debugger rights and so on
[21:09:07] <jevin>         im guessing the self capabilities flags are offset 0x20 in the self header
[21:09:18] <Mathieulh> capabilities aren't in the header
[21:09:23] <Mathieulh> they are part of the metadata
[21:09:28] <Mathieulh> as in, they are encrypted and signed
[21:10:16] <jevin>         offset 0x10 in the section header?
[21:10:29] <Mathieulh> it's after the metadata keys
[21:10:33] <jevin>         no, they wouldnt be per section
[21:10:50] <Mathieulh> as in, right after them
[21:11:09] <jevin>         i see. so unself doesnt have enough fields in the metadata header
[21:11:35] <jevin>         i really should color in the hex values that are mapped to structures in unself vs ones that arent
[21:11:42] <jevin>         seems like it is missing a lot
[21:11:49] <Mathieulh> everything public is missing tons
[21:12:15] <Mathieulh> capabilities are optional mind you
[21:12:35] <jevin>         are they restrictive or permissive?
[21:13:11] <Mathieulh> restrictive
[21:13:16] <Mathieulh> (for most)
[21:42:15] <jevin>         Mathieulh, you said that the geohot npdrm keypair is blacklisted in 3.56
[21:42:30] <jevin>         i couldnt find the decrypted or encrypted metadata keypair in 3.56 files
[21:42:47] <jevin>         where does the blacklisting occur? is it a hash that is blacklisted?
[21:43:08] <jevin> its interesting to me because we can make our own keypairs now with juan nadie's work
[21:48:45] <Mathieulh> <jevin> Mathieulh, you said that the geohot npdrm keypair is blacklisted in 3.56 <== not only that
[21:49:03] <Mathieulh> geohot stuff doesn't generate some of the npdrm specific values
[21:49:08] <Mathieulh> those were not checked in 3.55
[21:49:13] <Mathieulh> but they are checked in 3.56 now
[21:49:55] <jevin>         Mathieulh, gotcha
[21:50:09] <jevin>         is his keypair actually blacklisted somewhere though?
[21:50:10] <Mathieulh> there is no whitelist for npdrm
[21:50:22] <Mathieulh> so it's actually possible to generate valid npdrm self for 3.56+
[21:50:42] <jevin>         is it a check in appldr?
[21:50:43] <Mathieulh> that tool I made a screenshot of actually does that
[21:51:02] <Mathieulh> jevin yeah, it's enforced by lv1 though
[21:51:16] <jevin>         a hash comparison?
[21:51:27] <Mathieulh> yeah it's a hash
[21:51:30] <Mathieulh> but I won't say more
[21:51:35] <jevin>         ok :)
[21:51:55] <Mathieulh> everything you need is in the 3.56 fw :P
[21:52:16] <jevin>         rgr, i will poke around later
[21:52:34] <jevin>         the checks are unmodified in 3.60+?
[21:52:43] <jevin>         + new keys of course
[21:52:51] <Mathieulh> same checks
[21:54:53] <Mathieulh> jevin you won't get around crafting valid 3.56+ npdrm selfs without a proper makeself tool though
[21:57:18] <jevin>         would SCE make npdrm selfs work if actually signed?
[21:57:25] <jevin>         + crypted
</pre>
Please note that all contributions to PS3 Developer wiki are considered to be released under the GNU Free Documentation License 1.2 (see PS3 Developer wiki:Copyrights for details). If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly and redistributed at will, then do not submit it here.
You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource. Do not submit copyrighted work without permission!

To protect the wiki against automated edit spam, we kindly ask you to solve the following hCaptcha:

Cancel Editing help (opens in new window)