Editing Vulnerabilities

== Userland ==

=== WebKit 531 (Vita FW BEFORE 2.00) ===

There are two exploits used for WebKit prior to 2.00. One is a data leakage exploit CVE-2010-4577 <ref>https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=63866</ref> using type confusion to treat a double as a string memory address and length. The other is a type confusion exploit CVE-2010-1807 on the parseFloat() function using a Nan as the arg.
<ref>http://imthezuk.blogspot.com/2010/11/float-parsing-use-after-free.html</ref>

=== WebKit 536 (Vita FW 2.00 thru 3.18) (CVE-2012-3748) (2013-09-03-1)===

The heap memory buffer overflow vulnerability exists within the WebKit's JavaScriptCore JSArray::sort(...) method.  This method accepts the user-defined JavaScript function and calls it from the native code to compare array items. If this compare function reduces array length, then the trailing array items will be written outside the "m_storage->m_vector[]" buffer, which leads to the heap memory corruption.<ref>http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/123088/</ref>

=== WebKit 537.73 (as used in Vita FW 3.30-3.36) (CVE-2014-1303) ===

The CSSSelectorList can be mutated after it's allocated. If the mutated list contains less entries than the original one, a restrictive 1-bit OOB write can be achieved.
<ref>https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-14/materials/eu-14-Chen-WebKit-Everywhere-Secure-Or-Not.PDF</ref>
<ref>https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-14/materials/eu-14-Chen-WebKit-Everywhere-Secure-Or-Not-WP.pdf</ref>
<ref>https://cansecwest.com/slides/2015/Liang_CanSecWest2015.pdf</ref>

=== WebKit 537.73 (as used in Vita FW 3.50-3.60) (unknown or no CVE) ===

The JSArray::sort method has a heap use-after-free vulnerability. If an array containing an object with a custom toString method is sorted, and the toString method causes the array to be reallocated, then the sorted elements will be written to the old freed address.

https://blog.xyz.is/2016/webkit-360.html

=== PSM Mono privilege escalation ===

https://yifan.lu/2015/06/21/hacking-the-ps-vita/

=== PSM Unity privilege escalation ===

UnityEngine.dll is a trusted assembly (SecurityCritical) and is not signed (can be modified). However, the actual file at <code>ux0:app/PCSI00009/managed/UnityEngine.dll</code> is [[PFS]] signed and encrypted, making this (and any) resource based hacks just as difficult as unsigned code execution hacks (which is the original goal).

=== PSM NetworkRequest privilege escalation ===

NetworkRequest.BeginGetResponse(AsyncCallback callback) invokes callback with <code>SecurityCritical</code> allowing for a privilege escalation. Unfortunately, Sony closed down the scoreboards feature <ref>http://community.eu.playstation.com/t5/Announcements-Events/PSM-scoreboard-service-is-closing/td-p/21263959</ref> which means that Network.AuthGetTicket() fails and Network.CreateRequest() cannot be invoked. There is no other way of creating a NetworkRequest object.


using System;
using System.Security;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
using Sce.PlayStation.Core.Services;

namespace NetHax
{
	public class AppMain
	{
		[SecurityCritical]
		public static void Escalate (IAsyncResult result)
		{
			Console.WriteLine("Should be SecurityCritical");
			IntPtr ptr = Marshal.AllocHGlobal(1000);
			Console.WriteLine("Look at me allocating memory: 0x{0:X}", ptr);
		}
		
		public static void Main (string[] args)
		{
			Network.Initialize("af1c0a1b-a7b8-4597-a022-eee91e6735d1");
			Network.AuthGetTicket();
			NetworkRequest req = Network.CreateRequest(NetworkRequestType.Get, "", "");
			IAsyncResult result = req.BeginGetResponse(new AsyncCallback(Escalate));
			while (!result.IsCompleted)
			{
				Console.WriteLine("waiting...");
			}
			Console.WriteLine("Completed!");
		}
	}
}


== System ==

== Kernel ==

=== Stack buffer overflow in sceSblDmac5EncDec ===
(16/09/2014)

might have found one
SceSblDmac5Mgr_sceSblDmac5EncDec
reads in 0x18 bytes from first arg
processes a little
then
ROM:005F711A                 MOV             R1, R11
ROM:005F711C                 ADD             R0, SP, #0x88+var_70
ROM:005F711E                 MOV.W           R2, R10,LSR#3
ROM:005F7122                 BLX             _import_SceSblSsMgr_SceSysmemForDriver_sceKernelMemcpyUserToKernel
R10 comes from orginal read in buffer+0x10
bad news is it got patched in 1.80
they also added a isShell check


'''Consensus''': Confirmed exploitable before 1.80. YEAH!

=== sceIoDevctl does not clear stack buffer ===
(24/11/2014)
Call some interesting functions that interest you in a kernel context (call some damn syscalls)
Then call devctl and get upto 0x3FF bytes of that stack!


    sceIoDevctl("sdstor0:", 5, "xmc-lp-ign-userext", 0x14, WINDOW_BASE+0x10, 0x3FF);
    store(RET, WINDOW_BASE+0x4);


=== Syscall handler doesn't check syscall number ===

(03/07/2015) A large syscall number passed in R12 can overflow syscall table and cause an arbitrary function pointer to be dereferenced and executed.

This was patched somewhere >1.60.

=== Heap use-after-free in sceNetSyscallIoctl ===

(5/04/2016) sceNetSyscallIoctl is declared as <code>int sceNetSyscallIoctl(int s, unsigned flags, void *umem)</code>. When <code>memsz = (flags_ >> 16) & 0x1FFF</code> is in range (0x80; 0x1000], it will use SceNetPs custom malloc to allocate a buffer of that size on the heap. However, the second argument to malloc is 0, meaning that when not enough memory is available instead of returning NULL, it unlocks the global SceNetPs mutex and waits on a semaphore. Then, while malloc is waiting, another thread can free the socket sceNetSyscallIoctl is operating on, causing a use-after-free condition.

When passed proper arguments, sceNetSyscallIoctl will execute a function from the socket's vtable at the end:


      v13 = (*(int (__fastcall **)(int, signed int, unsigned int, char *))(*(_DWORD *)(socket + 24) + 28))(
              socket,
              11,
              flags_,
              mem_);


Confirmed exploitable on 3.60 still.

== Non-secure Kernel Loader ==


== Secure Kernel ==


== Hardware ==


== F00D Processor ==


=== Disclosed by Yifan Lu ===

Yifan Lu has written an article on how to exploit the F00D processor on their personal blog (11/01/2019).
https://yifan.lu/2019/01/11/the-first-f00d-exploit/

== References ==