Bugs & Vulnerabilities

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Theoretical Hardware Attacks[edit | edit source]

We already know for certain someone out there has hacked the SAMU or stolen Sony's keys because of leaked decrypted kernels. These are some end-all hardware solutions to hack the PS4, theorized by golden. I give a score out of 10 for each.

Power analysis against SAMU 9.9/10[edit | edit source]

There are theories that this won't work because...

  • SAMU silicon spoofs hamming weight (prevents differential power analysis and EM analysis)
  • It is running too fast and not feasible since cost is too high
  • You cannot slow down the SAMU clock since it is internally checked
  • Some more issues?

If there is some sort of main CPU/SAMU PLL bypass we might be able to slow the clock down really easily, otherwise we must inject our own clock signal. I believe the SAMU clock is controlled by syscon? If the check is in syscon then we can just patch it out. Maybe write a custom Linux fork that never loads into usermode but just sits and constantly decrypts different self/sprx files. We could communicate with this Linux fork over UART. This attack only needs to work once to recover some keys.

SAMU power/clock glitch fault injection 5/10[edit | edit source]

During an AES round we might be able to do some SCA by injecting faults. See the paper from umass.edu in the section below. We would write a minimal operating system to reboot into after exploiting an older firmware. This 'operating system' will simply shutdown most of the CPU cores and pin one core. This code would communicate with the SAMU and do everything the normal SCE SAMU driver does for decryption. We can then use UART output from CPU to time our glitch attacks. The faulty data retrieved by our custom SAMU driver might be able to reveal secret key data. This attack only needs to work once to recover some keys.

SAMU backside UV/IR fault injection 3/10[edit | edit source]

Just as the title states. Very expensive to setup and do properly. If we can flip an even number of bits it the encrypted SAMU SRAM region of the chip (even since ECC parity bit), then some sort of side channel analysis might be able to be done to recover key material. Some silicon reverse engineering would be involved to find the SRAM region on die.

"Moreover, it is no longer possible to hit a single SRAM cell with the current etching technologies, since the width of the gate dielectric is now more than 10 times smaller than the shortest wavelength of visible light." To get an idea of the cost of this equipment... "A class of threats which cannot be ignored if the attackers have access to a larger budget (above the aforementioned $3000 and up to millions of dollars)" (http://euler.ecs.umass.edu/research/bbkn-IEEEP-2012.pdf)

The fault injection is all infeasible unless some elite hackzor came out of the woodwork. We only need to have this work once.

SEM/FIB/microprobes 2/10[edit | edit source]

We might be able to readout the bootrom with some microprobes? Sniff data lines somewhere? The SAMU SRAM memory is encrypted so we would have to probe the LM32 instruction bus or something... infeasible but possible.

USB[edit | edit source]

The FreeBSD USB stack has been theorized, by a well know security researcher, to contain some high profile bugs. A dongle might just be possible. For example, last year someone ran a fuzzer on the Linux USB stack and found some crazy bugs: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/found_bugs_usb.md

Bluetooth[edit | edit source]

Look at Blueborne and CVE-2017-0781. There are probably some bugs in the Sony/FreeBSD Bluetooth stack. Sony has a habit of ruining their own copy and paste. One of the reasons fail0verflow decided to attack the DS4 controller firmware was because it had a nice interface to the kernel which could contain bugs.

Software Bugs[edit | edit source]

SnagFilms[edit | edit source]

A possible exploit has been found in the SnagFilms app in the PS Store app.

Arbitrary code execution in memory has been demonstrated, although so far the system will throw an exception in the programs memory before the payload finishes loading.

If you craft a small enough payload and/or a payload that loads without causing an exception in program memory, you can most likely get usermode code execution.


BattleCars Exploit (Buffer Overflow in Rocket League)[edit | edit source]

Back in time, it affected the latest System Software version (2.57) and the most recent application version (1.03).

First block all requests from:https://patch103-dot-psyonix-rl.appspot.com/

When you launch Rocket League, it gets a stub file from: http://psyonix-rl-529970.c.cdn77.org/BC2/versions/103/config/BattleCars_Prod/client.bin

You can redirect that to load a huge file and/or a specifly crafted payload instead of the stub. If you use the proper file, it does not need to be that large, the example below is under 9MB.

Your file will be loaded into memory, when the file is large enough/a game is played and/or you wait enough time, you can consistently cause a buffer overflow and the application will crash.

Depending on how you craft your payload, you may or may not have to do any of that get it working. There are no checks performed at all on file size, content, etc.

Staying on the start screen for long enough can also trigger it. If your payload is not created properly, it will take much longer to execute.

If you are having problems getting this working, you can use the example file, causing an almost instant buffer overflow upon launch of the application.


If your payload is crafted properly, you should be able to get it working within 10-20 seconds of launching the application.

A carefully crafted file may be able to exploit this or similar issues to gain code execution, among other things. It may also be possible to alter gameplay via similar methods.

No payload will be provided at the moment because this is very experimental.

VidNow (TCP Buffer Overflow)[edit | edit source]

A possible exploit has been found in VidNow app from the PS Store App.

PATCHED: Sony has hotfixed this exploit via content hashing the file while in transit. Some people have managed to reverse the hotfix but the method is not known. The PS4 checks the content hash HTTP header from the HMAC header.

When you launch Vidnow for the first time it gets http://sceecatalogs.vidzone.tv/386/vidzone_386_US.db.psarc. This file is 5MB. This file loads into a 60k tcp buffer. No checks are done at all on the files size/hash/contents. Therefore, it is possible to redirect Vidnow to load a substitute file. When vidnow is redirected to load a large enough file the TCP Window buffer is overrun,somewhere between byte 34,125,000 and 35,000,000 of the substitute file. Despite the buffer overflow and crash, the substitute data is still transmitted and the application only throws the exception when another tcp packet is sent. As a result, the application crashes and the console locks up for a minute. Directly before the console resumes normal operations after the crash, an unusually large number of tcp (RST) packets are sent. While no exploit that makes use of this crash is currently available, a carefully crafted file may be able to exploit this or similar issues to gain code execution, among other things.

Crash Timeline[edit | edit source]

17:17:39.899984000 Request
17:17:40.000655000 Request
17:17:40 (System locks up) Crash
17:17:44.957274000 Response
17:17:48.500481000 Response
17:17:48.500567000 Response
17:17:50.356427000 (System no longer locked up) Console Regains Control (74 byte packet sent)
17:17:50.357555000 Contacts Crashlog Server/System Operation Resumes

Leap second 23:59:60 bug[edit | edit source]

Leap second 2015 June 30, 23h 59m 60s should theoretically not be a problem, since PS4 is based on BSD which can implement 23:59:60.

6.20+ DevKit Specific Bug[edit | edit source]

The Development Kit comes with breakpoint feature that can pause the execution of an application program when the application program accesses a certain location in memory. This data breakpoint is only triggered when an application program accesses memory, but, because of a bug that occurred in version 6.00 of the system software, such breakpoints may be triggered when the kernel accesses the memory of an application program. When this happens, the PlayStation 4 system determines that a serious error has occurred and automatically shuts down the Development Kit.

6.50 DevKit Specific Bug[edit | edit source]

This bug occurs regardless of the method used to set the data breakpoint (occurring both when a breakpoint is set with the host tool and when it is set with the sceDbgSetHardwareBreakPoint() API). Version 6.50 of the system software will be fixed so that data breakpoints are not triggered when the kernel accesses an application program's memory (thus returning to the behavior of versions of the system software prior to version 6.00).

Reference sites[edit | edit source]